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Abstract. Organisations today operate in a world fraught with threats,
including “script kiddies”, hackers, hacktivists and advanced persistent
threats. Although these threats can be harmful to an enterprise, a po-
tentially more devastating and anecdotally more likely threat is that of
the malicious insider. These trusted individuals have access to valuable
company systems and data, and are well placed to undermine security
measures and to attack their employers. In this paper, we engage in a
critical reflection on the insider threat in order to better understand the
nature of attacks, associated human factors, perceptions of threats, and
detection approaches. We differentiate our work from other contributions
by moving away from a purely academic perspective, and instead focus
on distilling industrial reports (i.e., those that capture practitioners’ ex-
periences and feedback) and case studies in order to truly appreciate how
insider attacks occur in practice and how viable preventative solutions
may be developed.
Key words: insider threats, human factors, technical and psychological
indicators, detection approaches, survey reports
1 Introduction
Corporations today face an increasingly difficult task when it comes to their
computer security. On the one hand, there are a plethora of threats (e.g., crim-
inals, hackers, hacktivists) keen to penetrate defences and compromise systems
and data. On the other hand, internal (or insider) threats appear to be on the
increase and can be particularly debilitating given their privileged access to the
enterprise. The insider-threat problem is especially concerning because corpora-
tions’ defences are arguably still focused on external threats, resulting in inad-
equate consideration of attacks originating from those with inside knowledge of
and access to systems, security processes, and precious company secrets.
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To explore this problem further, and to better understand the various ele-
ments involved, this paper engages in a critical reflection upon the threat posed
by insiders. We adopt a novel perspective that moves away from a purely the-
oretical discussion and instead concentrates on distilling the range of indus-
trial reports, which capture broad experiences and feedback from practition-
ers [1, 2, 3, 4]. We also look at case studies of insider-threat (our own [5] and
those from CMU-CERT [6]), in order to further understand how and why insider
attacks occur, and how effective detection tools can be developed and deployed.
Our reflection on the insider-threat problem is split into three broad sections.
Firstly, we consider the nature of human insider-threats. This includes an inves-
tigation into the types of attacks actually being launched against enterprises,
an analysis of the motives and psychological aspects surrounding these attacks,
and the impact that new technologies may have on the future of insider attacks.
We move on to study many of the industry reports that have been published
(e.g., [2, 7, 8]), in order to assess how corporations perceive and are responding
to this type of risk. Our findings suggest that there is an underestimation of
the risks associated with these threats, particularly evidenced by the minimal
investment being made. Finally, we describe techniques that are currently used
for detecting insider threats, and explore the state-of-the-art research that is
currently being conducted in this area, discussing the effectiveness of techniques
and what limitations may exist. To conclude, we discuss own research within the
Corporate Insider Threat Detection project (CITD), which aims to address the
interdisciplinary nature of insider threat, to provide an enhanced detection tool
that addresses both technical and human dimensions of insider threat.
2 The nature of insider threat
In order to understand the nature of the insider-threat problem, there are sev-
eral fundamental questions of interest. For instance, what exactly is the threat,
and what are the most prevalent types? What motivates insiders to attack? Are
some insiders more susceptible to becoming a threat? What behaviours may be
indicative of an (impending) attack? What is the effect, if any, of new technolo-
gies on the problem? These are the questions which we seek to discuss in this
section, with a special focus on real-world cases, feedback and reports.
2.1 Types of insider threat
There have been many definitions of insider threat throughout the years [9].
Some of these definitions emphasise the active misuse of insider privileges, while
others broaden the scope and consider the negative impact of such misuse on
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the organisation’s systems and
data [6]. The essence of most definitions, however, is that an insider threat is
a member of trusted personnel (e.g., employee, contractors, business partners)
that used their privileged access for some unauthorised purpose such as revenge
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or financial gain, and to the detriment of their enterprise. CMU-CERT [6] iden-
tifies three types of threat based on observation of typical patterns and on the
attacker’s purpose and motivation – namely, fraud, theft of Intellectual Property
(IP), and sabotage of infrastructure.
Insider fraud is regarded as one the most frequent kinds of attack [2]. Inci-
dents of fraud can range from direct theft of company funds, to complex cases
where company services or data is illegitimately traded for personal financial
gain. Kroll Advisory’s recent fraud report emphasises the strong link between
fraud and insiders, in that, of the companies hit by fraud in the last year, more
than 67% identified an insider as a leading perpetrator, signalling yet another
increase from previous years’ studies [10]. While this is concerning, an even more
disturbing aspect looking forward is that according to the Risk of Insider Fraud
report [2], practitioners continue to believe that their enterprises are at a high
risk of insider fraud. This is clearly a serious and prevalent problem in companies
today and, as hinted above, financial gain is one of the most common motives.
Another threat that causes great concern is IP theft. In this attack, insiders
use their access to steal valuable company data, including trade secrets, business
information, source code and customer information [11]. There are several key
features of this type of attack. First, the target tends to be product information,
proprietary software and source code (these are clear targets in CMU-CERT
studies [12]). Also, attacks appear more likely to be conducted by technical
personnel (e.g., scientists and engineers) [6] and using technical means (54% of
insiders used either email, remote access channel or network file transfer [11])
rather than physical theft of prototypes, for example. Finally, a majority of these
thefts are committed by employees with legitimate access to the stolen IP; almost
75% stole material they had authorized access to [12]. Although 75% is a strong
statistic and it is therefore very tempting to monitor only these individuals for
this attack, yet as other articles have highlighted (e.g., the case of the foreign
national who stole Ford secrets worth in excess of $50 million [13]), insiders with
no legitimate access are also causing a great deal of harm.
Incidents involving IT sabotage, as one might imagine, tend to be more tech-
nically sophisticated. These attacks often require privileged access to systems
and networks, or particular knowledge of how they are configured. Examples of
specific insider attacks range from insertion of malware (most commonly, logic
bombs) to tampering and disrupting system hardware components. Moore et
al. [14] provide one of the more comprehensive points of reference for data on
these types of attack. Amongst their findings, some of the most significant in-
clude the high proportion of attackers who had system-administrator privileges
(90%) and the crucial role of unmet expectations, disgruntlement and stress in
the pathways to an attack (for instance, 92% of all the insiders in their sam-
ple attacked enterprises following a negative work-related situation or event). In
terms of real-world cases, the attempted attack on Fannie Mae [15] is a perfect
example of the sabotage threat. Presumably aggrieved after being dismissed,
the insider in this case used the last hours of his legitimate access to upload
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malicious code set to auto-execute 7 days later and designed to erase essential
company data on finances, securities and mortgages.
In addition to the focus on malicious insiders (covered above), emphasis on
benign or accidental insiders has also grown [16]. These individuals have legiti-
mate access to systems, but through carelessness, neglect or accident introduce
a form of insider attack. These accidental attacks have become more important
to organisations and researchers because, as studies such as the Credant [17]
and Clearswift [18] surveys point out, they occur significantly more often than
their malicious counterparts. Unwise email activities and loss of storage devices
or laptops are some of the most common sources of these breaches. Further ana-
lysis on the different types of benign insiders can be found in several reports,
particularly the Symantec’s Data Loss Prevention white paper [19] where the
author distinguishes a number of categories of negligent insiders.
2.2 The psychology of the insider
Researchers have argued that insiders have specific psychological traits and char-
acteristics. Turner and Gelles [20], for instance, believe the following types of
behavioural indicators need to be considered when examining insider risk: self-
centredness, arrogance, risk-taking, manipulativeness, coldness, self-deception
and defensiveness. Others have suggested that insider threats score high on the
personality traits that make up the ‘Dark triad’: narcissism, Machiavellianism
and psychopathy [11, 12, 14, 20]. The UK’s Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure (CPNI) have identified a number of other personality characteris-
tics they believe are typical of an insider, including: immaturity, low self-esteem,
amoral and unethical perspective, superficiality, proneness to fantasy, restless-
ness and impulsivity, and lack of conscientiousness [21].
If it is indeed the case that insider threats possess specific psychological
traits and characteristics, then it might aid detection if employers were able to
be privy to their employees’ psychological make-ups. However, there is also the
possibility that specific personality characteristics are linked to specific attacks
rather than all attacks. For example, an insider who scores high on narcissism
and Machiavellianism and is a risk taker might be more likely to commit IP
theft but less likely to deface Web sites. Moreover, psychological characteristics
on their own are clearly not enough to predict that someone is likely to become
a malicious insider, and also that there are other personal attributes that should
also be considered.
It has been argued that shorter-term psychological or emotional states can
also help identify the type of individual who is more likely to attack their organ-
isation. Such psychological states might include stress, depression or anxiety, for
instance. It has been theorised, for example, that those under extreme stress are
more likely to become threats [11, 20]. It might be that the insider instigates the
attack to help alleviate the stress that they are encountering. It is argued here,
however, that consideration of psychological states in isolation is not sufficient.
As is often the case, an external event can trigger a psychological state. Take
the case of a person who has experienced financial hardship – such an event
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may well cause extreme stress; however, in addition, the individual might see an
opportunity at work to conduct fraudulent activities which will help them out
of their problems. In contrast, someone who is under extreme stress because of
marital problems (exhibiting the same behaviours as in the previous case) might
be far less likely to conduct fraudulent activities. These examples illustrate the
importance of developing a more holistic model on insider-threat psychology.
In addition to external events, psychological disorders have been reported to
make some employees more of a risk to an organisation. CPNI have found that
those with a gambling or drug addiction are more likely to attack an organisation
than those without such addictions [21]. Of course, if an individual is identified as
having such a problem, then an organisation might find ways to provide support
for that individual, which in turn might reduce the risk they pose.
In considering the psychology of the insider we might want also to consider
their attitude towards the workplace. For example, a person who scores high
on the dark triad traits and is highly stressed might be less likely to attack
an organisation if they have a strong affinity to their workplace. CPNI have
found that those who do not follow established procedures, or read or follow
announcements and instructions issued by their organisation, are more likely to
attack an organisation [21]. Others have identified the ‘disgruntled employee’
as a real potential risk [22]; that is, someone who believes they have not been
fairly treated by their organisation (e.g., missing out on a promotion). Our belief
is that those who have a strong identification with their workplace, and then
experience an event which leads them to disgruntlement, pose a greater risk.
Whilst our preliminary findings have identified important psychological factors
in the context of insider-threat, it becomes quite apparent that there is much
more work to be done in this space, by considering a more complete view of the
attributes that are associated with identifying potential insider-threats.
2.3 The impact of new technologies
As new technologies evolve within organisations, so does the potential insider-
attack surface [3, 18]. Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) is becoming increasingly
popular within many organisations, and yet in the survey by Ponemon [2], al-
most half of the 700 participants state that BYOD has resulted in a significant
increase in fraud risk. The same study also reports significant challenges in se-
curing corporate data and networks that are now being accessed through this
growing gamut of personal devices. There is a definite trade-off being experienced
between the convenience and cost-savings of BYOD, as against the security im-
plications and attack vectors that this also introduces, which organisations will
need to consider carefully in the future. Cloud services also introduce difficulties
regarding security of information. Credant expands on the risks associated with
the cloud, and highlight that although this distributed approach has benefits,
it translates into a direct loss of control for the business [17]. This introduces
yet another possible attack vector, and could also be exploited as part of an
attack by existing employees or by the third parties involved. Again, this raises
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the trade-off of convenience and cost-savings against maintaining and managing
both data and security from within the walls of the organisation.
Social-media use is also generating complex new challenges for enterprises [8,
23]. Through sites such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs and forums, sensitive in-
formation (e.g., trade secrets, organisation plans and IP) can be leaked much
more easily than before and publicised to anyone, anywhere in the world. The
literature is full of cases of this happening, and its affect on both private and gov-
ernmental organisations [24, 25]. Malicious or careless insiders are not the only
concern either. As a result of the amount of information freely shared on these
sites, external entities can now exploit social media to identify, target or recruit
prospective insider threats [8]. As social media continue to expand in popularity,
organisations appear to underestimate the power and reach that they can have.
However, the ethical and legal concerns about monitoring personal communica-
tions, and whether this is a breach of privacy, remain to be resolved.
3 Insider threat from the organisational perspective
From the previous section, it is clear that the threat from insiders is real and sig-
nificant. Despite this fact, however, reports suggest that corporations continue
to underestimate the associated risks, as especially evidenced by minimal in-
vestment. For example, the findings in the State of Security report [7] show that
many companies allocate between 11-14% of their annual revenue to their total
IT budget, and of this, they spend 10-14% on security-related issues in general.
Investment in detecting and preventing insider threats is therefore likely to be
much lower. Of course, the appropriate amount to invest must be determined
contingently, by individual companies, depending on their circumstances. But
there is evidence of general underinvestment in mitigating this risk at the board
level. Another article [8] reports that 25% of respondents stated that there was
no regular formal review of cybercrime threats by the Chief Executive Officer
and the Board. This suggests that security in some corporations still has not
reached the level of importance that it warrants, and again, this obviously has
knock-on effects for any hope of adequately managing the risk of insider threat.
More specifically, Ponemon’s survey concludes that a large number of com-
panies are not attributing the appropriate priority to the risk of insider fraud,
while also noting that it is becoming more of a challenge [2]. One of their main
observations as it pertains to organisations’ views on risk is that, although 61%
of respondents rated the threat of insider fraud within their enterprise as very
high or high, only 44% believed that their company viewed the prevention of
insider threats as a top priority in security. This highlights that even though
organisations view themselves as somewhat unprepared, there does not appear
to be an overwhelming impetus to address the risks. These findings mirror those
in earlier studies such as McAfee’s report [7], where 68% of companies recognise
insider threat in their security plans but only 48% have actually addressed it.
Another indication that companies may be underestimating insider threat
is the lack of awareness demonstrated by employees and the dearth of training
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programmes offered. In one report [23], it was found that 42% of large companies
surveyed do not conduct on-going security awareness training sessions with staff
and, worse yet, 10% fail to brief staff on induction. This trend of poor awareness
in organisations can also be seen more globally, as highlighted in the Global
State of Information Security survey [3]. The issue here is that due to a lack of
training, personnel may be unaware of new risks that insider crimes may present
to the company or, indeed, may have forgotten about the risks they used to be
aware of. Due diligence is also a particularly salient point, as we continue to
see evidence (e.g., [1]) of a considerable number of companies not conducting
personnel background checks on their employees.
Companies’ views on insider risk can also be understood from how they treat
them once detected. The first aspect to note is that they are typically under-
reported [8, 26]. In Kaspersky’s article [26], for instance, respondents reported
that in 59% of the cases nobody outside the company was notified. PwC’s sur-
vey [8] supports this point, but also found that for very serious fraud offences,
some only issued a warning (18% of respondents) and, in a few incidents, organ-
isations did nothing at all (4% of the cases). While we might assume that failure
to report incidents is linked to the fear of negative publicity, it is unclear why,
even in the case of serious insider incidents, stricter measures are not under-
taken. This might further emphasise an underestimation of the problem within
corporate culture, but could equally be due to a dearth of solid evidence.
4 Detecting insider threats
As the problem of insider threat continues to escalate, there is a growing focus on
how to detect such attacks. Here, we explore the current techniques for detection,
and where state-of-the-art research is moving towards in the future.
4.1 Techniques in use
A variety of approaches have been proposed to mitigate the risk of insider
attacks, focusing on prevention, detection and response. Best practices from
CMU-CERT include: considering threats from insiders and business partners in
enterprise-wide risk assessment; logging, monitoring, and auditing employee’s
online actions; anticipating and managing negative workplace issues; and devel-
oping insider incident-response plans [6]. While a number of these are in com-
mon use, the Malicious Insider Threats report notes that many more could be
adopted [1]. As discussed in Section 3, what is required is improved education
and awareness within enterprise, to encourage active use of such practices.
A key point that arises from published sources (e.g., [12]) is that many at-
tacks are detected by non-technical means (e.g., co-workers noticing suspicious
behaviour). Kaspersky’s survey article on insiders also identifies reporting by co-
workers as the main detection resource as well (indicated in 47% of cases), but
also notes the contribution of IT staff in discovering irregularities in system activ-
ity logs (41% of cases) [26]. PwC’s cybercrime survey identifies three approaches
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that organisations use to detect threats: corporate controls (e.g., suspicious-
transaction monitoring), corporate culture (e.g., whistle-blowing systems), and
those beyond the influence of management (e.g., discovering by accident or a
third-party) [8]. They found that the effectiveness of corporate-culture methods
has declined compared to previous years. From the detection methods reported,
the only noteworthy increase in effectiveness compared with previous years was
in automated suspicious-transaction monitoring (up from 0% in 2005 to 18%
in 2011). It was observed, however, that whistle-blowing and tip-offs are still an
important part of detection, contributing to suspicious behaviour being reported
rather than overlooked. This does not stop at employees alone, since reports of
suspicious behaviour may come from law enforcement, business partners, and
even from customers [12, 26].
Activity logs are becoming more widely used for detecting suspicious activity
conducted on organisations’ systems [26]. These can provide detail on a range
of activities that employees conduct, from entering buildings and logging-on to
systems, through to the e-mail communications that they make and the files
that they access on a data server. This mass of data provides a wealth of infor-
mation on employee usage patterns, including any potentially malicious activity
that they may choose to carry out. However, due to the large amount of data
that can potentially be logged, actually analysing this can quickly become a
laborious and error-prone task. There is growing interest around the notion of
automated detection of insider threat, and more recently there have been com-
mercial software tools such as SpectorSoft’s Spector360, SureView by Raytheon,
and DarkTrace. The Risk of Insider Fraud report emphasises this desire for
automated tools for detecting and analysing insider risk [2].
Many anomaly-based approaches [27, 28] aim to establish what an employee’s
normal activity may look like, and then analyse how their current behaviour
differs from this normal. This opens up a number of challenges, such as how to
establish what is actually normal behaviour within an organisation, particularly
given that there may already be malicious activity present, and how much of
a deviation causes an employee to be classified as a potential insider threat.
All organisations will operate differently, as do all humans, and so there will
exist many forms of what is deemed to be normal. Likewise, the routine that
employees will perform activities on a daily basis will often vary based on their
current workload, their personal life, and their mindset, as well as demands made
of them by supervisors and co-workers. An employee may well be asked, or need,
to perform activities that are outside of their expected normal in order to fulfil
their job, and yet this would be flagged as anomalous behaviour. For a system to
automatically determine whether an employee is posing a threat or not requires
very careful management by the system analyst. An excess of false-positives
results in a burden of cases that require investigation, and could result in high
resentment by employees. On the other hand, a false-negative would render such
a system a failure and could allow the organisation to be severely damaged. It is
clear then, that there are many challenges still left to overcome in terms of both
detecting, and also analysing, the threat posed by an employee’s actions.
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4.2 State of the art in research
Given the severity of insider threat within many organisations and the strong
desire to detect and prevent future attacks, there has naturally been a wealth of
research around the problem. Here, we shall examine some of the most notable
contributions in the literature and address issues that are currently present.
Brdiczka et al. [29] present an approach for proactive detection of insider
threats. Their method incorporates structural anomaly-detection, which consists
of four stages: graph-structure analysis, graph embedding, dynamic tracking,
and anomaly-detection. As they address, this identifies anomalies within the
data, not necessarily threats. In order to assess the potential of a threat, they
conduct psychological profiling using the Big-5 model, with behavioural, text
analysis, and social-networking information as the data used for their profiling.
For experimentation, they detect malicious insiders in World of Warcraft data as
a proof-of-concept. As acknowledged by the authors, however, in-game malicious
behaviour is much more obvious than that of an insider threat in the workplace,
who aims to be discrete in their malicious intent. Therefore it would be of great
interest to know how the approach copes with more realistic data.
Greitzer et al. [30, 31] discuss the use of psychological factors for identifying
potential insider threats. They propose a Bayesian Network model that consists
of a variety of binary observable behaviours (e.g., engagement, accepting crit-
icism, confrontation, performance, stress, absenteeism). Each behaviour has a
prior probability that estimates how frequently it occurs, and a weighting term
that specifies how significant the behaviour is with regard to monitoring threats.
They derive conditional probabilities through a training process, using expert
judgement to assess the threat that an employee exhibits based on particular pa-
rameters being set to true. Due to the qualitative nature of the behaviours that
are modelled, there remains a need for a human observer to assess whether the
employee in question is exhibiting such characteristics. The authors note that
future work is necessary to develop methods for automatically extracting and
inferring psychological factors from employee-data analysis, rather than using
subjective behavioural assessment, which is clearly a non-trivial task to achieve.
Kandias et al. [32] also present a prediction model that consists of psycho-
logical profiling and real-time usage profiling. These two aspects serve as input
to a decision manager that determines whether the user is a potential threat,
based on scoring their motive, opportunity and capability. Each user is catego-
rized by their system role, their capability, their predisposition and their stress
level. The psychological profiling is conducted by questionnaires that cover user
sophistication, predisposition and stress level, whilst the usage profiling consists
of monitoring system calls, intrusion-detection systems, and honeypots. The au-
thors state that their future work will focus on the implementation of the model,
and so there is currently no indication of how well this performs. The use of ques-
tionnaires for psychological assessment raises issues such as the accuracy of the
answers provided by participants. In addition, a sophisticated insider may well
be capable of circumventing traditional monitoring tools as part of their attack.
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As we have seen, there are many proposals for managing insider threat. These
approaches draw on a wide range of tasks, such as monitoring, detection, pre-
vention, and prediction. Yet still the insider-threat problem persists. One reason
for this is the difficulty of implementing such approaches in real-world environ-
ments. Proposals that rely on psychological profiling, for instance, may require
compliance from the insider at some stage (e.g., accurate completion of ques-
tionnaires). Similarly, gathering data on psychological and behavioural factors
within a workplace is a challenging task, as it also requires the attention and
compliance of other employees (e.g., reporting suspicious behaviour), while also
appreciating the related legal and ethical considerations with such monitoring.
Regarding the development of prototype detection systems, the lack of re-
alistic testing data representing the activities monitored still remains a difficult
hurdle to overcome. There has been work on the development of synthetic-data
generation, such as that by CMU-CERT [33], where malicious-insider threat data
is inserted within normal employee-monitoring data. However, they acknowledge
that even these datasets lack the noise and variation that would be present in
any real-world data. Undoubtedly, however, and as stressed in [1], there is cer-
tainly more that could be done by organisations in order to help support and
develop the research surrounding insider threats. Previously, we have proposed
a conceptual model for insider-threat detection [34]. As part of our on-going
research, we have developed an initial system that is capable of reasoning about
the threat posed by an individual, based on their observed activities in the tech-
nical domain, whilst also incorporating behavioural analysis and psychological
assessment. Whilst the system performs well in preliminary experimentation, we
are currently at the stage of requiring more complete data, either synthetic or
real-world, in order to truly evaluate its effectiveness.
5 Conclusions
Our research in the CITD project recognises the multi-disciplinary nature of
insider threat, covering research into the psychological and behavioural aspects
that motivate an individual, development of detection systems and analysis tools,
and education and awareness-raising within organisations. As a means to detect,
prevent, and deter insider threat, the collaboration between these developments
is fundamental for addressing the problem effectively. What is clearly apparent,
though, is that the insider-threat problem is evident in all types of organisa-
tions, can originate in a variety of individuals, ranging from low-level employees
through to high-ranking business partners, and can escalate into an attack in
many different ways. In this paper, we provide a study on the problem, with the
intention of allowing for a better understanding of the nature of insider threats,
industry views on the risks faced, and prevention and detection techniques in
practice and research. With this critical reflection on current findings and devel-
opments, we believe that this serves as an important stage in understanding the
ever-persistent and ever-evolving threats that are increasingly occurring within
organisations of today.
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